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1 Source: The World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (we use the world 
export share of world GDP). Since world 
exports = world imports, imports have risen by 
the same amount.
2 Previous Business Review articles have 
questioned the extent to which globalization 
has taken place. The article by Janet Ceglowski 
reviews research on barriers to international 
trade. Examining another dimension of 
globalization, Sylvain Leduc explores the lack 
of international diversification of investment 
portfolios.
3 They estimate an overall average increase 
of 74 percent in the prices of goods in these 
countries.
Globalization has many facets.  
One of the most important is the enor-
mous increase in international trade.  
Over the past 40 years, world exports 
as a share of output have doubled to 
almost 25 percent of world output.1
However, despite globalization and 
the increasing share of output that is 
exported and imported internationally, 
economic evidence suggests that sig-
nificant barriers to international trade 
still exist.2 We will summarize the lat-
est developments in the measurement 
of international trade barriers, drawing 
mainly from a recent comprehensive 
survey on the subject by James Ander-
son and Eric van Wincoop. In their 
lobalization has led to an enormous increase 
in international trade. Over the past 40 
years, world exports as a share of output have 
doubled to almost 25 percent of world output. 
However, despite this enormous increase, economic 
evidence suggests that significant barriers to international 
trade still exist. In this article, Edith Ostapik and Kei-Mu
Yi summarize the latest developments in the measurement 
of international trade barriers.
survey, these authors report estimates 
of the magnitudes of different catego-
ries of international trade costs.  They 
find that, on average, international 
trade costs almost double the price of 
goods in developed countries.3
The primary policy implication of 
the existing research is that globaliza-
tion still has a long way to go, so that 
there is still plenty of room for trade 
to grow.  Growth in trade will likely 
occur primarily through technological 
changes that reduce transportation or 
communication costs or from long-
run policy choices, such as a national 
currency or language.  Reduction in 
policy-related barriers, such as tariffs, 
will also play a role.  
WHY AND HOW TRADE COSTS
REDUCE TRADE
The core idea underlying the 
benefits of international trade goes 
back to Adam Smith and his famous 
pin factory parable. According to 
Smith, when each worker specializes in 
doing only those tasks he is best suited 
to do, a factory achieves its maximum 
economic efficiency. Smith and later 
economists extended this argument 
from firms to countries.  Economic 
efficiency occurs when each country 
specializes in making and exporting 
only those goods it is relatively efficient 
at producing.  In turn, each country 
imports those goods other countries 
produce relatively efficiently.4
4 David Ricardo formalized the notion of 
relative efficiency in his theory of comparative 
advantage. One of the most powerful ideas 
in economics, comparative advantage shows 
that countries can gain from trading with each 
other, even if one country is more productive 
at producing every single good than another 
country. Textbooks on international economics 
(for example, the one by Richard Caves, Jeffrey 
Frankel, and Ronald Jones or the one by Paul 
Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld) provide a more 
detailed description of comparative advantage. 
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International trade enhances a society’s 
economic well-being because it facilitates 
specialization in production.
In other words, international trade 
enhances a society’s economic well-
being because it facilitates specializa-
tion in production. With trade, prices 
consumers pay for goods are lower 
than those they would pay without 
trade. According to Smith and later 
economists, when trade is free and 
unfettered, a society maximizes its 
economic well-being. 
Barriers to international trade pre-
vent the efficient outcome described 
above from occurring. For example, 
because these barriers raise the costs 
of purchasing imported goods, U.S. 
consumers would buy fewer foreign 
goods, and foreign consumers would 
buy fewer U.S. goods. To satisfy the 
demand for products that previously 
had been imported under free trade, 
each country would now be making 
more goods it is not relatively efficient 
at producing. In the presence of inter-
national trade barriers, there would 
be less specialization, prices would be 
higher, and, overall, consumers in all 
countries would be worse off.  
THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF 
TRADE COSTS
In 19th-century England, econo-
mist David Ricardo used these core 
ideas of the benefits to international 
trade to argue against a pressing politi-
cal barrier to trade: the Corn Laws, 
which protected British agriculture 
and kept domestic food prices high. 
Since then, economists have studied 
many other barriers to trade. We will 
describe these barriers in terms of 
costs, following the convention used by 
Anderson and van Wincoop.5
Broadly, trade costs are all costs 
incurred from the time a good leaves 
5 Anderson and van Wincoop divide trade 
costs into three broad categories: border-related 
costs, international transportation costs, and 
distribution costs.  We focus only on those costs 
associated with international trade: border-
related costs and international transport costs.
the factory or its place of production 
to the time it is purchased by the 
end-user. Such costs can be incurred 
internationally (for example, at the 
border) or domestically (that is, within 
a country).  In the case of consumer 
goods such as automobiles, televisions, 
clothing, and food, trade costs are the 
difference between the price at the 
“factory gate” and the retail price.6
International trade costs can be 
broadly divided into two main catego-
ries: border-related costs and interna-
tional transportation costs. Border-re-
lated costs encompass the broad range 
of trade barriers encountered between 
nations, excluding international trans-
portation. These barriers include costs 
that occur specifically at the border, 
such as tariffs, quotas, and paperwork 
due to customs and other regulations, 
as well as those differences between 
countries that could affect trade, such 
as different currencies, languages, or 
laws (contract enforcement).7 Together 
with international transport costs, 
these items make up the costs incurred 
internationally.
Border-related costs can be 
classified based on whether they are 
attributable to (national) government 
policies. This allows economists to 
assess the importance of border costs 
imposed by government policy relative 
to other border costs. Border-related 
costs imposed by government policy 
are further separated by economists 
into two categories: tariffs and nontar-
iff barriers.
Tariffs are additional charges 
added to the price of a good imported 
from another country. The charge is 
usually levied as a proportion of the 
price, similar to a sales tax. Nontariff 
barriers8 are loosely defined as all other 
trade barriers imposed by national 
governments. The most familiar of 
these are quotas, which are restrictions 
on the quantity of a good that can be 
imported from a country. They also 
include voluntary export restraints, 
which occur when the exporting 
country “voluntarily” agrees to limit 
its exports to the importing country; 
anti-dumping actions, which are taken 
when foreign firms are suspected of 
selling their goods at a price below that 
in their home market;9 paperwork and 
regulatory procedures encountered 
6 In the case of intermediate goods such 
as automobile engines, semiconductors, 
textiles, and wheat, trade costs are the 
difference between the “factory gate” price 
and the purchase price by the next firm in the 
production sequence.
7Economists have studied the importance of 
international networks in reducing the negative 
effect of these country-level differences on 
trade. For example, James Rauch and Vitor 
Trindade find that trade flows are greater 
between countries with larger shares of 
Chinese population. They hypothesize that 
this linguistic and cultural network facilitates 
trade by reducing information and contract 
enforcement costs otherwise present between 
pairs of countries.  
8 The main data source for tariffs and nontariff 
barriers is the United Nations’ Conference on 
Trade and Development TRAINS database. 
This database lists eight broad categories of 
trade control measures, which can be further 
broken down into 150 sub-categories.
9 Dumping occurs when exports are sold in 
foreign markets at a price below their domestic 
price or production costs (according to U.S. 
policy).  An anti-dumping action is the filing, 
by a domestic firm or industry, of an accusation 
that a foreign firm or industry has dumped 
goods in the domestic market. If the foreign 
firms are found guilty of dumping, the domestic 
government levies a duty on the goods in 
question for a fixed period of time.  22   Q3  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
In its simplest form, the gravity model is a 
statistical relationship that seeks to explain 
trade between two countries (bilateral trade) 
by three forces: the economic sizes of the two 
countries and the distance between them.
specifically at the national border; 
and “softer” measures, such as product 
labeling and product quality standards.
Border barriers not due to govern-
ment policy include information costs 
(costs incurred by potential import-
ers in finding out more about the 
goods they are buying); costs due to 
exchange rate uncertainty, linguistic 
barriers, or other cultural differences; 
and contract enforcement costs.        
International transportation costs are 
freight charges and transport time 
associated with moving goods from the 
exporting to the importing country. 
These costs include all freight and 
time costs associated with moving a 
good from the factory in the export-
ing country to the first port of entry in 
the importing country. Freight charges 
include trucking, shipping, and air 
charges.
MEASURING TRADE COSTS
We can measure trade costs two 
ways. The first is to simply measure 
them directly from concrete data.  The 
second involves an indirect approach 
whereby the costs are inferred using 
an economic model of bilateral trade 
flows known as the gravity model. 
Border-Related Costs. Tariffs 
are the easiest to measure because they 
are directly collected by U.S. Customs 
officials. Detailed data are collected 
on tariff rates for thousands of goods. 
There are two approaches to combin-
ing the detailed tariff data into an 
overall average tariff measure for the 
country. One approach is to com-
pute an average across all tariff rates.  
While this way is simple to implement, 
it is problematic because it weighs all 
goods equally, regardless of whether 
imports of the good are $10,000 or $10 
billion.    
A second approach is to weigh the 
tariff rates according to the volume 
of imports. In the above example, 
the tariff on the heavily imported 
good would have a weight 1 million 
times larger than the weight on the 
other good. However, this approach 
is problematic, as well. Suppose that 
tariff rates on Canadian apples were 
so high that U.S. consumers did not 
import them at all.  Clearly, the tariffs 
on apples are negatively affecting 
imports.10 But precisely because their 
impact is so negative that imports fall 
to zero, they would have a zero weight. 
In other words, this approach tends 
to underestimate the true impact of 
tariffs. Despite this shortcoming, most 
calculations of overall average tariff 
rates employ this second approach. 
Calculating other border-related 
trade costs, especially nontariff trade 
barriers, is considerably more difficult. 
In his study, Patrick Messerlin con-
verts the nontariff barriers into a tariff 
equivalent.11 For quotas, Messerlin uses 
direct information from case studies 
to do the conversion. For the anti-
dumping measures, he either directly 
converts them to tariff-equivalents12 or 
uses the ratio of the “dumping” price 
10  The following historical example illustrates 
the effect of a tariff on the volume of imports. 
In April 1984, the U.S. government increased 
the tariff rate on heavyweight motorcycles 
from 4.4 to 45 percent. From 1983 to 1984, the 
total customs value (the value at the “entry 
gate” of a country) of heavyweight motorcycle 
imports (700-790 cubic centimeters of engine 
displacement) fell from $5.7 million to $55,000.  
11 In their survey, Anderson and van Wincoop 
cite Messerlin’s article.
12 Ad valorem duties, which are taxes levied as a 
percentage of the value of the imported goods, 
are converted directly.
to the standard world price to convert 
the measures to tax equivalents. These 
different measures are summed to 
an overall tariff equivalent and then 
combined with the average tariff rate 
to yield an estimate of border-related 
trade costs imposed by government 
policy.
For border-related trade costs not 
related to government policy, econo-
mists generally rely on a combination 
of direct and indirect measurement 
based on the gravity model. For exam-
ple, the costs of not sharing a common 
currency or a common language, as 
well as security costs and information 
costs, are calculated using the gravity 
model.
In its simplest form, the gravity 
model is a statistical relationship that 
seeks to explain trade between two 
countries (bilateral trade) by three 
forces: the economic sizes of the two 
countries and the distance between 
them. Economists perform a statistical 
analysis called a regression in order 
to obtain an estimate, for example, of 
the effect of an increase in distance on 
trade flows.
More sophisticated versions of the 
gravity model include additional vari-
ables to further explain bilateral trade 
flows. In our context, the additional 
variables capture whether the two 
countries share a common currency, 
language, border, trade agreement, or 
legal system.  While the lack of a com-
mon currency, for example, will not 
show up as a direct add-on to the price 
of the imported good as does a tariff, 
it will still reduce trade.  The gravity Business Review  Q3  2007   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
regression provides a statistical means 
for measuring the tariff-equivalent of 
this reduction in trade.13
International Transport Costs.
The four primary modes of transport 
are boat, rail, truck, and airplane.  
The two key transport costs are direct 
freight, or shipping, costs and travel 
time. Exporters must decide on the 
most efficient mode (or combination 
of modes) of transport for their goods, 
balancing per unit shipping costs and 
travel time.  In general, transport 
by air is more expensive in terms of 
freight costs but cheaper in terms 
of time. In addition, countries with 
poorly developed infrastructure (for 
example, roads, airports, and ports) 
will generally have higher freight costs 
compared with countries that have 
large stocks of infrastructure.
Anderson and van Wincoop 
explore research on measuring freight 
costs, where shippers and handlers are 
interviewed, industry trade journals 
are examined, and customs data are 
analyzed.  Customs data provide both 
total imports including freight charges 
and total imports excluding freight 
charges. These customs data facilitate 
the calculation of total freight charges 
associated with importing.14
Anderson and van Wincoop ulti-
mately draw from an article by David 
Hummels for a measure of internation-
al transport costs because he incorpo-
rates time into transportation costs.15
In his article, Hummels develops meth-
odologies to translate time costs into 
dollars, from which the costs can then 
be expressed as a percentage of the 
value of the good transported.  Then, 
the freight costs and the time costs can 
be totaled to yield an overall measure 
of international transport costs.  
ESTIMATES OF TRADE COSTS
Before beginning the discussion of 
estimating trade costs, we advise the 
reader to review the table and figure. 
The table contains a breakdown of 
the two main international trade costs 
and their components. The figure 
illustrates the importance of tariffs 
and other border-related costs, on the 
one hand, and international trans-
port costs, on the other hand, via a 
hypothetical example of a pair of shoes 
produced in a foreign country and 
shipped to the U.S.  
Tariffs. To arrive at a single 
overall tariff measure for a country, 
economists typically calculate average 
tariffs according to the trade-weighted 
method discussed above. Average 
tariffs can differ across countries for a 
number of reasons, but the most obvi-
ous and basic reason is that tariff rates 
on individual goods are higher in one 
country than in another.16 Anderson 
TABLE
A Breakdown of Trade Costs*
Description 
Percent Markup over the
Price of the Good
time costs 9
+ shipping costs 11
Total Transport Costs 21




+ security costs 3
Total Border-Related Barriers 44%
TOTAL 74%
* The table presents the various trade costs described in this paper, along with categorical 
sub-totals and the final total. In totaling these components of the overall trade cost, recall the 
multiplicative accounting procedure employed by Anderson and van Wincoop, described in 
detail on page 25. 
13 The tariff-equivalent of the effect of not 
having a common currency could be calculated 
if the gravity regression includes both tariff 
rates and a variable for whether or not the two 
countries share a common currency.  Then, 
the regression would indicate how much a 
one-percentage-point change in tariffs reduces 
trade, and it would also indicate how much not 
sharing a common currency would reduce trade.   
From these two pieces of information, the tariff-
equivalent of not sharing a common currency 
can be calculated.  
14 From these two measures it is possible to 
calculate the average free on board (f.o.b.) 
price (the price on the mode of transport 
before any trade costs) as well as the average 
cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) price.  The 
difference between these two numbers is one 
way of measuring transport costs. 
15 See the 2001a article by Hummels.24   Q3  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
FIGURE
following numbers from Anderson and 
van Wincoop indicate. At the low end 
in 1999, Switzerland, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore had 0 percent tariffs. At the 
high end, Australia and Canada had 
average tariffs of about 4.5 percent. In
between were New Zealand and the 
major advanced economies, includ-
ing Japan, the United States, and the 
European Union (EU), which had 
and van Wincoop report that in 1999, 
this trade-weighted average tariff rate 
ranged from 0 to 30 percent across 
different countries. They find that 
developed countries’ tariffs tended 
to be considerably lower than tariffs 
in developing countries: Developing 
countries tend to have tariffs of more 
than 10 percent, while developed 
countries’ tariffs are in the range of 0 
to 5 percent.  
While average tariffs in devel-
oped countries are low, there is some 
variation between countries, as the 
Foreign Home
*The other border barriers do not represent direct add-ons to the price, 
as in the case of tariffs or NTBs, for example.  Rather, they represent the 
increase in the overall price of the good that would generate the same 
reduction in trade as these barriers. (See text.)
Note: This diagram of the trade-related mark-ups on a pair of shoes that 
costs $100 before wholesale and retail distribution is not based on an 
actual case study. It is a hypothetical example of a commonly traded 
good. The path followed from start to finish illustrates the effect of the 































































16 Another reason would be if a country happens 
to heavily import those goods that face high 
tariff rates.  This would be unusual, however, 
because high tariff rates presumably discourage 
imports.Business Review  Q3  2007   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
average tariffs of about 2 to 3 percent.  
Nontariff Barriers. Tradition-
ally, the tendency has been to apply 
nontariff barriers broadly to goods in 
a few sectors, as Anderson and van 
Wincoop show using United Nations 
data.17 For example, nontariff barriers 
in 1999 were applied, respectively, to 
74 percent, 71 percent, and 39 percent 
of the categories of goods in the food, 
textiles, and wood-related sectors.18
This contrasts with the overall picture 
of nontariff barrier coverage in 1999, 
where only 1.5 percent of all goods 
were protected by such barriers. Ad-
ditionally, there has been a rise in 
other types of nontariff barriers, most 
notably anti-dumping actions. If these 
anti-dumping actions were included 
in the nontariff barriers, the share of 
all goods protected increases to 27.2 
percent in 1999.19
Incorporating all of these types 
of trade policy barriers into models, 
researchers have found that for the EU
in 1999, tariffs and nontariff barriers 
can be translated into a 7.7 percent 
“tax” on industrial goods. In light of 
the tariff numbers presented above, 
this estimate indicates that for the EU, 
at least, nontariff barriers exert more of 
a tax than do tariffs.
Other Border-Related Barriers.
Using the gravity model described 
above, a number of researchers have 
been able to estimate, for developed 
countries, the indirect trade costs at 
national borders. Anderson and van 
Wincoop summarize the main find-
ings as follows: (1) The costs of not 
sharing the same language are roughly 
7 percent of the value of the goods 
traded.  (2) The cost of employing dif-
ferent currencies is about 14 percent. 
(3) Information costs are 6 percent. (4) 
Security costs are 3 percent. 
Overall, these nonpolicy border-
related costs equal 33 percent.  Note 
that the combined effect is not ob-
tained by simply adding up each border 
cost. Rather, because each border cost 
is applied to the total value of trade 
inclusive of all other border costs, a 
multiplicative formula must be used:  
(1.07)*(1.14)*(1.06)*(1.03)-1 = 0.33 
(or 33 percent).20 Adding government 
policy barriers to these barriers yields 
a total border-related trade cost of 
(1.33)*(1.077)-1 = 0.44 (or 44 percent).
International Transport Costs.
Anderson and van Wincoop report 
results on transport costs from another 
article by David Hummels.21 Using 
U.S. national customs data to get de-
tailed data on transport costs and then 
calculating a simple average across all 
of the costs, Hummels obtains a freight 
transport cost estimate of 10.7 percent.         
Anderson and van Wincoop also 
report results from Hummels on-time 
costs.22 As of 1998, about half the 
value of U.S. exports are shipped by 
air.  Hummels imputes a willingness to 
pay for saved time and translates that 
into a percentage of the value of the 
goods shipped. His estimate of U.S. 
time costs is 9 percent.23 Combining 
the freight costs and the time cost 
estimates yields a total transport cost 
of (1.107*1.09-1) = 0.21, or 21 percent 
of the price of the good at the factory 
gate.
To summarize, Anderson and van 
Wincoop list two main sources of trade 
costs: border barriers and international 
transport costs. They then draw on the 
existing empirical research to obtain a 
rough approximation of each of these 
costs for the United States, as well as 
an approximation of the overall costs. 
All border barriers, including tariffs, 
nontariff barriers, and nonpolicy bar-
riers, add up to a 44 percent “tax” on 
imports. Transportation costs are an 
additional 21 percent.  Combining 
these costs — again using the multi-
plicative formula — yields the final 
overall tax-equivalent international 




impede the free 
flow of goods and 
services, leading to 
increased production 
by relatively inefficient 
firms, thereby 
reducing the overall 
economic well-being 
of societies. 
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s Trade Analysis & Information 
System: TRAINS, and general insight from 




18 In 2005 the World Trade Organization’s 
textile quota system known as the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) was phased out. However, 
subsequent dramatic changes in trade flows 
have caused countries to invoke other methods 
to control the amount of textiles traded.
19 All percentages reported are simple averages 
of the nontariff barrier coverage ratios over 
the appropriate categories of goods (that is, 
the share of total goods in a category that are 
subjected to nontariff barriers).
20 When border costs are small, the 
multiplicative formula yields numbers very 
similar to what would be obtained by adding 
up the costs.  However, when border costs are 
large, the formula yields numbers quite different 
from those obtained by simple addition. 
21 See Hummels’ 2001b article.
22 See Hummels’ 2001a article.
23 This is a sharp decrease from 32 percent in 
1950.CONCLUSION
Barriers to international trade 
impede the free flow of goods and 
services, leading to increased produc-
tion by relatively inefficient firms, 
thereby reducing the overall economic 
well-being of societies. While the glo-
balization of the world’s economies has 
seized the attention of policymakers, 
the media, and economists, researchers 
have recently collected a great deal of 
evidence that indicates that barriers 
to trade remain quite high. The types 
and magnitudes of these barriers in 
developed countries are highlighted in 
an important recent article by James 
Anderson and Eric van Wincoop.  
Combining the results from cur-
rent research on trade costs, Anderson 
and van Wincoop find that border 
barriers and international transport 
costs are equivalent to a 74 percent tax 
on the factory gate price — 74 percent 
seems like a high number; imagine a 
sales tax that high!  How is it that in 
a rapidly globalizing world the costs of 
international trade are still so high?  
For evidence of these high trade costs, 
it is useful to look at the United States 
data in relation to the predictions of 
theories of international trade.   
The United States is the world’s 
largest economy, yet its output is still 
less than one-third of the world total.  
If there were no costs to international 
trade – if it were as costless to ship 
goods to Europe and China as it is to 
send an e-mail – most existing trade 
theories would predict that the United 
States would export about two-thirds 
of its output.  In fact, exports are only 
about 10 percent of U.S. GDP.  From 
the sharp divergence of the theory’s 
prediction and the actual data, we can 
infer that costs to international trade 
are quite high.
Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
article shows that nonpolicy barriers 
account for the vast majority of total 
trade costs. Policy barriers, such as 
tariffs and quotas, play a smaller role. 
Will these nonpolicy and policy barri-
ers ever be completely eliminated? The 
answer certainly is no. It is not possible 
that the economists’ idealized world 
of frictionless trade in which trade 
costs and barriers are zero will ever be 
realized.  
For the world’s developed econo-
mies, however, significant reductions 
in trade costs and increases in trade 
can come from technological improve-
ments that reduce international trans-
portation costs, or from long-run policy 
changes, such as policies to reduce 
currency and information costs (or 
language and cultural barriers). One 
example is the recent adoption of a 
single currency, the euro, by 12 nations 
within Europe in 1999.24 In addition, 
Anderson and van Wincoop show that 
for certain categories of goods, policy 
barriers have been strongly persistent 
over time. If these barriers were to be 
reduced significantly or eliminated, 
this would further increase interna-
tional trade. Regardless of which bar-
riers fall, firms and consumers, on the 
whole, would be better off.  B R
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24  Between 2000 and 2005, euro-area trade 
increased by 10.3 percent, which was larger 
than the increase between 1993 and 1998 (8.3 
percent).  This is consistent with (but not proof 
of) the notion that the adoption of the euro 
reduced trade costs, thus increasing trade.REFERENCES
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